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Abstract 
The relative sizes of secular and religious populations belong to the most 
important social characteristics of each country. In the wake of religious change, 
family behaviour, including marriage and childbearing, is likely to be altered. 
European demographic trends, including those of late childbearing and low 
fertility are also likely to change when there is a growth of religious groups where 
conversion/secularisation rates are low and childbearing levels are high. We 
project the membership size of the various religious groupings until 2051 for 
Austria, a country where the religion question is included in the census, allowing 
detailed and accurate projections to be made. We consider relative fertility rates, 
religion-specific emigration and immigration, conversion rates and 
intergenerational transmission of religious affiliation. Our estimates suggest that 
the Catholic proportion will decrease from 75% in 2001 to less than 50% in 2051. 
The Muslim population, which grew from 1% in 1981 to 4% in 2001, will 
represent 14% to 18% of the Austrian population by 2051, and could represent up 
to 32% of those below 15 years of age. The Protestants’ population share will be 
stable at around 4%, while up to 34% of the population will be without religion. 
 
 
1  Religions in Austria: Past, present, prospects 
Austria was in the past—as it is today—predominantly Roman Catholic, though 
several religious minorities, in particular Jewish and Orthodox communities, have 
existed for many centuries. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
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following the reformation, many Austrians converted to Protestantism, though the 
Habsburg emperors remained Roman Catholic. The Counter-Reformation, led by 
Ferdinand II around 1600, had the effect that Austria again became almost 
exclusively Roman Catholic. It was only on the force of the Tolerance Patent 
enacted by Joseph II in 1781 that the Protestant, Orthodox Christian and Jewish 
faiths ceased to be forbidden (Reingrabner 1981; Bundespressedienst 2004). 
However, most Austrians remained Roman Catholic, and the 1869 census reveals 
that the proportion of Catholics varied between 94.8% and 99.8%, depending on 
the region of the country1 (Flora 1983). 
During the twentieth century the religious landscape of Austria changed 
profoundly. In 1900 about 92% of the population of Austria was Roman Catholic, 
and by 2001, the share of Roman Catholics had decreased to 74%, as shown in 
Table 1. During the same period, the share of those without religious affiliation 
rose from 4 to 12%, the Muslim community from 0 to 4% and other religious 
groups from 3 to 5%2. The main reason for the decrease in the number of Roman 
Catholics was the high degree of secularisation. Immigration of individuals with 
other religions and differences in fertility levels between religious groups also 
contributed to the phenomenon, but to a lesser extent than secularisation. During 
the economic boom in Austria in the 1960s, many Turkish and Yugoslavian 
workers migrated to Austria as “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers). Immigration was 
also high during the 1990s due to continued family reunification and the wars in 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, while immigrants also came from other 
countries, particularly Germany (Münz, Zuser and Kytir 2003). 
 
Table 1: 
Resident population in Austria by religion, 1900-2001 
Year 
Roman 
Catholic 
(%) 
Protestant 
(%) 
Muslim 
(%) 
Other 
religion 
(%) 
Without 
religion 
(%) 
Unknown 
(%) 
Total 
(absolute) 
1900 91.6 2.7 0.0 5.4 0.2 0.2 6003780 
1971 87.4 6.0 0.3 1.5 4.3 0.6 7491526 
1981 84.3 5.6 1.0 2.0 6.0 1.0 7555338 
1991 78.0 5.0 2.0 2.9 8.6 3.5 7795786 
2001 73.6 4.7 4.2 3.5 12.0 2.0 8032926 
Sources: Statistics Austria, Census 1900, Census 1971, Census 1981, Census 1991 and Census 2001. 
 
Table 2 shows the religious composition by age for the years 1981, 1991 and 
2001. Roman Catholicism is the largest religion for all age groups. The bulk of 
                                                 
1  Includes only regions on the present territory of the Austrian Republic, not the entire Austro-
Hungarian Empire. 
2  We divide the population into five main categories: Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, 
other religions, and individuals without religion. 
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those without any religion are aged 30-60 years. As discussed in Section 4.4, 
many are not members of the Roman Catholic church in active labour market 
years. However, they seem to be re-entering the church as they age beyond 60, 
based on observations from our longitudinal data. One potential explanation is 
that they are more reluctant to pay taxes in peak-income years.3 
 
Table 2: 
Share of population by age and religion in Austria in 1981, 1991 and 2001 (in per 
cent) 
  Roman 
Catholic 
Protestant Muslim Other 
religion 
Without 
religion 
Population 
Population 6372645 423162 76939 230553 452039 7555338
0-9 88.7 4.7 2.0 2.8 1.8 910515
10-19 91.5 5.0 0.9 1.7 0.9 1258231
20-29 86.0 5.2 1.4 3.7 3.6 1124280
30-39 80.0 6.2 1.8 4.6 7.3 1016078
40-49 82.4 5.7 1.0 3.4 7.4 903131
50-59 80.2 6.0 0.3 2.8 10.6 889445
60-69 79.7 6.4 0.1 2.5 11.3 657617
19
81
 
70+ 81.8 6.1 0.0 2.9 9.2 796041
Population 6081454 388709 158776 494596 672251 7795786
0-9 83.9 4.2 3.3 5.5 3.2 915017
10-19 85.1 4.5 3.2 5.1 2.1 944238
20-29 79.2 4.5 2.8 7.2 6.2 1347278
30-39 75.0 4.6 2.6 8.3 9.4 1153678
40-49 71.5 5.6 2.1 7.7 13.2 1008043
50-59 76.1 5.3 1.0 5.5 12.2 862804
60-69 75.6 5.6 0.2 4.9 13.7 790436
19
91
 
70+ 77.7 6.1 0.1 5.2 10.8 774292
Population 5915421 376150 338988 439104 963263 8032926
0-9 76.5 4.2 8.1 5.8 5.4 879759
10-19 81.4 4.2 6.0 4.7 3.7 957680
20-29 73.5 4.1 6.3 6.4 9.6 1011808
30-39 70.7 4.3 5.0 6.4 13.7 1373153
40-49 70.0 4.5 3.8 6.6 15.1 1150990
50-59 67.7 5.3 2.5 6.1 18.5 966800
60-69 74.8 5.2 1.0 3.7 15.3 783653
20
01
 
70+ 77.2 6.0 0.2 2.9 13.6 909083
Sources: Statistics Austria, Census 1981, Census 1991 and Census 2001. 
                                                 
3  Austria has special tax regulations for Catholics and Protestants. People have to pay “church 
taxes” directly to the church. While members of the Roman Catholic church have to pay 1.1% 
of their self-reported income, members of the Protestant church have to pay 1.5%. Muslims do 
not pay taxes but are encouraged to dedicate gifts to their religious community. 
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In this study, we project the future religious composition in Austria using a set 
of scenarios that take into account age-specific fertility, migration and 
secularisation. We base our estimates on a rich set of data covering the entire 
Austrian population from 1981 to 2001. The dataset allows us to estimate age-, 
sex- and religion-specific migration and fertility in addition to the number of 
exiting and entering members from and to the different religions4. 
An important caveat concerning the research presented over the next pages is 
that our categories of levels of religious affiliation do not reflect religious 
intensity. This explains why this analysis is purely quantitative. Standard value 
surveys such as the European Values Study show strong variation among 
countries and religious groups that could for example explain other differentials 
associated with religion. However, these measures of religious intensity are 
difficult to integrate into this exercise where the main purpose is to project the 
future relative size of religions in Austria.  
 
 
2  Data collection on religions and projections 
Most datasets on religion are based on surveys, and very few contain detailed 
information for the whole population over time. Surveys can be biased as it may 
be difficult to get a representative sample of the population of a nation with 
respect to religious affiliation. The Austrian dataset used in this study may 
overcome problems associated with potentially biased surveys, as it is based on 
census information for the complete Austrian population, rather than just a small 
sample.  
The definition of the degree of adherence to a religious group is difficult, as 
some individuals may be intensely religious, while others are only superficially 
religious. Hence our census data information (which does not include the degree 
of religiosity) may conceal differences in the degree of religious intensity between 
religious groups. Thus religious adherence could more frequently be a dominant 
identity trait in certain religious groups, while only a secondary identity 
characteristic in other religions.  
A number of countries, such as India, Israel, Canada, Mexico and the United 
Kingdom, include religion in their censuses (Statistics Austria ISIS, Statistics 
Canada 2001, Statistics India 2001, Statistics Israel 2004, INEGI 2000, Statistics 
United Kingdom 2001). Among the countries that omit the question about 
religious affiliation in their censuses, some consider it a violation of personal 
                                                 
4  In Austria, secularisation of Protestants and Catholics represents the main conversion flows 
between religions. Switching religion is otherwise quite seldom. In keeping with this, the 
Muslim authorities in Austria report zero members exiting out of the Islam religion. 
Anne Goujon et al. 241 
freedom.5 However, some nations that omit the question, including the United 
States, collect information on religion from surveys6.  
Projections were also made in Switzerland in the framework of a larger study 
on religious groups’ demographic characteristics in Switzerland (Bovay and 
Broquet 2004; Haug and Wanner 2000). However, these projections only go up to 
2020, too short a period to take into account the impact of fertility differentials. 
Similarly, Statistics Canada (2005) made projections for the religious composition 
in Canada until 2017, which includes fertility and mortality differentials, as well 
as transfer of religion from mother to child, though conversion between religions 
is not considered. 
Fliegenschnee, Goujon and Lutz (2004) project the future size of the 
Protestant population in Austria. They foresee a substantial decrease, partly 
because of secularisation and partly because of the conversion of children of 
mixed couples (where one partner is non-Protestant). The analysis reveals 
substantial differences especially between the capital Vienna and other regions in 
the rate of secularisation, where secularisation trends in Vienna are much 
stronger. 
Barrett, Kurian and Johnson (2001) give extrapolations for the size of 
religions in most countries of the world. Their work for the Austrian projection 
suggested that the share of Christians would continue to decline, perhaps falling 
as low as 75% by 2050. This finding clearly contrasts with our results, which may 
be due to the fact that they are based on the 1991 census, and that they use 
simpler projection techniques. Our projections indicate that the share of Christians 
decreases below 75% for all scenarios. 
Detailed projections on the population by religion are rare, and to our 
knowledge, no earlier projection of religions based on a complete census takes 
into account both differential fertility, migration, conversion rates as well as the 
impact of mixed-religious marriages on the religion of children. 
 
 
                                                 
5  In the United States, the question on religion was collected from religious organisations in the 
beginning of the 20th century, but, for privacy reasons, the law prohibits the United States 
Bureau of the Census from asking a question on religious affiliation on a mandatory basis. 
Other countries, such as Nigeria, omit the census question “since each religious and ethnic 
group would prefer numerical superiority over the other, it might be safer to ignore religion and 
ethnicity since there would be the temptation by each group to explore ways to have an edge 
over the other”, according to the head of the National Population Commission, Samaila 
Makama (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2005). 
 In Austria, there is a question on religion in the census but the information is not available to 
church tax authorities. The Catholic and Protestant churches collect the taxes by themselves. 
Hence, there are always more Roman Catholics and Protestants in the census than in the 
churches’ statistics. The difference is minimal, however: e.g., 5.89 millions Roman Catholics 
were registered by the church in 2001 whereas the census counted 5.92 millions.  
6  Survey data from the United States suggest that the proportion of Protestants in the United 
States fell for the first time fell below 50% in 2004 (Smith and Kim 2004). 
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3  Religious determinants of demographic events 
Regulating sexuality and fertility is central in the teachings of most major 
religions, and religious beliefs are powerful determinants of marriage, 
childbearing, divorce and other events related to family formation and dissolution. 
Examples of such rules are those regulating the minimum age at first sexual 
union, the number of wives or whether non-marital childbearing is prohibited. 
Such forces can influence the changing religious composition of a population over 
time, and could affect relative fertility rates, religion-specific net migration as 
well as the rate of conversion between religions and transmission of religious 
affiliation from parents to children. 
Religions differ in their emphasis on marital obligations, divorce rights, 
fertility demands and individual self-determination. As Figure 1 shows, religion 
could affect demographic patterns both due to directly expressed doctrines (e.g., 
that religious leaders forbid contraceptives) or indirect suggestions (e.g., 
promotion of early marriages which can lead to higher fertility). Moreover, beliefs 
expressed by religious leaders and religious texts make a difference only as long 
as the population is receptive and submissive to religious teachings (McQuillan 
2004). 
 
Figure 1: 
Influences of religion on demographic behaviour 
 
Studies looking at the effects of religion are prone to be upward biased if 
variables that are associated with, although not caused by, religious beliefs affect 
demographic behaviour (Sander 1992). Religious influence is contextual and is 
often mixed with politics and ideologies, to such an extent that the effects of 
religion can rarely be estimated without considering the social, geographic and 
economic circumstances of the given religious group. Poverty, low education 
levels, resource availability and political stability could cause demographic 
behaviour, and not necessarily only religion (Cohen 1996). Nevertheless, religion 
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has been found to have an independent effect, net of any economic and social 
influences, on various demographic and economic outcomes (Borooah 2004; 
Driver 1963; Lehrer 2005; Morgan et al. 2002). Furthermore, religious beliefs are 
likely to influence educational attainment, income levels and political stability. 
Therefore, assuming exogeneity of such variables could lead to a downward bias 
in the estimated influence of religion. 
Bivariate analyses suggest that there are differences in mortality rates between 
individuals adhering to different religions, but it is uncertain if this relation is 
causal. Moreover, whether various religious groups should live shorter or longer 
is uncertain. Individuals from several religious minorities in Austria are recent 
immigrants and the “healthy migrant argument” suggests that these migrants are 
positively selected and have a lower mortality than others coming from the same 
country. On the other hand, even positively selected migrants could have a shorter 
life expectancy than nationals of the new country due to large international 
differences in life expectancy which are attributable for example to exercise 
patterns or inherited diseases.  
Studies that control for confounding factors find that differences in mortality 
by religion are insignificant or small (Hummer et al. 2004; Strawbridge et al. 
2000). It is also highly uncertain if any such longevity differences will remain 
over time. We therefore assume equal life expectancy between members of 
different religions. 
 
3.1 Fertility 
We describe below the religious beliefs and practices in the order of the size of 
the denomination in the Austrian population according to the 2001 census. Hence, 
we describe the religious beliefs and practices first of the Roman Catholics, then 
of the Protestants and finally of the Muslims. Understanding differences in 
fertility patterns between religious groups is important as they have a reinforcing 
effect over time on the size of the different religions (lower/higher fertility leads 
to smaller/larger groups which in turn have fewer/more children).  
The Bible encourages high fertility. It states (Bible, Gen 1:28), “And God 
blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the 
earth”. The only permitted form of contraception in the Catholic church is the 
“calendar method” where one does not have sexual intercourse on the days of the 
month with the highest conception risk. However, although pronatalist measures 
may have had a historic impact among Austrian Christians, current church 
attendance is low and decreasing, and religious influences are becoming weaker 
(Berghammer 2003). 
Sander (1992) analyses American Roman Catholics born during the twentieth 
century and finds that from 1920 onwards, they no longer had higher fertility than 
the Protestant majority, but had adopted the same fertility patterns. This may be 
caused by the fact that despite the clear opposition to contraception and abortion 
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by the Roman Catholic church, as many as 87% of American Catholics believe 
that individual choice should prevail in family formation choices (Noonan 1986). 
Also, Roman Catholic European countries are currently well represented among 
those with “lowest-low fertility” (total fertility rate below 1.3), including Spain 
and Italy (United Nations 2004). 
The Protestant church does not have the same hierarchical structure as 
Catholicism7. As the influence of the church and religious leaders is generally 
weaker among Protestants (partly because of the emphasis on a direct relation to 
God), independent interpretation of the Bible and self-determination of faith has 
become central for this group. Protestants disfavour contraception and condom 
use to a much lower extent than other major religious groups. In contrast to the 
Catholic church (which is based on Bible and tradition), a Protestant turns to the 
Bible for answers to religious questions. As a consequence there are no universal 
binding clerical teachings on topics such as contraception, cohabitation or 
abortion, all of which are seen as private decisions. Acceptance of divorce and 
out-of-wedlock fertility as well as female heads of church are commonly 
accepted—and indeed have been for a longer time than in most major religions.  
Islam is supportive of family formation, where marriage and childbearing 
represent central elements in the religion. Muhammad strongly supported 
marriage, remarriage and fertility. He endorsed polygyny as a way of allowing 
widowed fecund women the opportunity to have children, which would increase 
the number of his followers and strengthen the religion: “Marry women who are 
loving and very prolific for I shall outnumber the peoples by you” (Al-Masabih 
1963). Additionally, a hadith states, that on the day of resurrection, the Prophet 
would be proud of the number of his community compared with other 
communities and that he admonishes his followers to reproduce and increase in 
number (Bakar 1995). Implications of Islam for fertility patterns may be stronger 
than for Christians in Austria as religiosity may be more intense (regular mosque 
attendance, stronger bond between the individual and the religious community, 
which often also share language and culture). Muslims’ distinct fertility patterns 
are evident in a number of different societies and many Muslims attribute their 
high fertility to their religion (Bovay and Broquet 2004; Borooah 2004; 
McQuillan 2004; Reynolds and Tanner 1995).  
Most Muslims in Austria are first or second-generation immigrants. Although 
fertility levels of immigrants tend to be related to their country of origin (Abbasi-
Shavazi 1998), the fertility rates of most immigrant groups tend to approach, if 
not converge to, the host country fertility patterns, which could decrease Muslim 
fertility in the coming decades (Nahmias 2004; Ram and George 1990).  
                                                 
7  The Protestant church does not have a central authority and there is a large degree of autonomy 
even at lower levels in the church hierarchy. The Protestant church relies mainly on the 
principles of Luther of “Sola Fide, Solus Christus, Sola Gratia and Sola Scriptura” (Only Faith, 
Only Christ, Only Grace and Only the Scripture), and takes the Bible as its source in religious 
questions (Miklas 2005).  
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There do not seem to exist any specific doctrinal prohibitions of contraception 
in Islam, which is supported by surveys of religious leaders and religious writings 
for example in Jordan (Underwood 2000). It is difficult to identify the official 
view due to the lack of a universal religious hierarchy. There is considerable 
support among many religious leaders for certain family planning practices, such 
as coitus interruptus or contraceptive pills, while substantial opposition exists 
against abortion and sterilisation (Chamie 1981; Simmons 2003). However, the 
Qur’an also includes advice that could lead to fertility depressing behaviour, 
including long nursing periods. Children should, according to the Qur’an, be 
nursed for two full years (Qur’an, Sura 2:233). 
 
3.2 Marriage 
Marriage is the only permitted form of living together and sexual union for 
Catholics. The Roman Catholic church describes marriage as a sacrament 
between man and woman originally founded by God (Catechism of the Catholic 
church 2005: 1603). The marriage consists of “conjugal fidelity, offspring, and 
the unbreakable union between the spouses.” (Martos 1997) 
The Bible, influencing the views of both Catholics and Protestants, 
emphasises the link between leaving the parental home and forming a marriage; 
“That is why a man leaves his father and mother and unites with his wife, and 
they become a new family.” (Bible, Gen 2:24) Hence, the church encourages 
leaving home, marrying and founding a new family. 
In Islam, marriage has a very high significance. Fitzgerald, Khoury and 
Wanzura (1976) argue that “[t]he Qur’an demands that every healthy believer has 
to marry.” Muhammad says in the traditions (Al-Massabih 1963), “Those of you 
who can support a wife should marry, for it keeps you from looking at strange 
women and preserves you from immorality”. Polygamy is often mentioned in the 
Qur’an (e.g., Qur’an, Sura 4:3), where a man is allowed to marry up to four wives 
if he can do justice between them all. However, when there is a difference 
between Islamic and public law, Western Muslim organisations such as the 
“Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland” argue that one should follow the laws of 
the country of residence as long as they do not contradict Islamic law. 
 
3.3 Divorce 
In the Catholic church, there is no divorce, only nullification of marriage. “[T]he 
Church maintains that a new union cannot be recognised as valid, if the first 
marriage was. If the divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a 
situation that objectively contravenes God’s law.”(Catechism of the Catholic 
church 2005: 1650) People can have their marriage nullified, for example if the 
vow of fidelity was broken or if they can show that one partner was not willing to 
get children (Veitschegger 2004). 
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Unlike the Catholic church, marriage is not a sacrament for Protestants, so it 
is possible to divorce and remarry. Of course family and marriage are part of the 
Protestant faith. However, central in Protestant teachings is a merciful God who 
will forgive mistakes (Miklas 2005), which implies that divorces are a possibility.  
The Qur’an describes rules for divorce, and Mohammed characterised divorce 
as “the thing most hated by God”. It may be particularly difficult for women to 
cancel marriages, which may partly explain Muslims’ lower divorce rates 
(Fitzgerald, Khoury and Wanzura 1976). 
 
3.4 Interreligious marriage and transmission of religion to 
children 
Whether intra-religious marriages are accepted, and to what extent religion is 
transmitted from parents to children, is important in affecting the number of 
adherents in the longer term. Some religions encourage strict upbringing of 
children and leave little opportunity for opting out. Others are more tolerant and 
allow people to exit the religious community without facing any sanctions. For 
Britain, Voas and Crockett (2005) find that if both parents are affiliated the 
probability of passing the religion on to the child is about 50%, while absence of 
religion is almost always passed on. 
For members of the Roman Catholic church in Austria, the impact of mixed 
marriages is not that important as 76% of Roman Catholic women who marry 
have a husband of the same faith (as shown in Table 3). The picture is however 
very different for the Protestant population where 84% of Austrian Protestants 
marry non-Protestant partners, mostly Roman Catholics (56%) or persons without 
religion (23%). Lutz and Uljas-Lutz (1998) estimated that only half of the 
children of these couples become Protestant. Lutz (1985) shows that the religion 
of the mother is more important than the religion of the father for the transmission 
of religion from parents to children.  
 
Table 3: 
Religious adherence of grooms and brides, in 2004 (in per cent) 
The bride Religious denomination 
of: Roman Catholic Protestant Muslim
Other 
 religion 
Without 
religion 
Roman Catholic 76.2 56.4 7.9 33.6 29.5 
Protestant 3.8 15.8 0.8 2.7 3.8 
Muslim 4.1 3.5 84.8 5.9 5.4 
Other religion 2.0 1.6 1.8 41.2 2.8 
Without religion 13.9 22.7 4.7 16.6 58.5 Th
e 
gr
oo
m
 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Statistics Austria (2006). 
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Table 3 reveals that for the smaller religious groups, there are generally fewer 
who marry within the same religion. Muslim women constitute an exception , 
where 85% of them have a Muslim husband, which could be because inter-
religious marriages are strongly discouraged in Islam (Fitzgerald, Khoury and 
Wanzura 1976). 
 
3.5 Acceptance of conversion to other religions and 
secularisation 
Today the freedom of religious choice is greater than in the past when most 
people did not have a choice in deciding on their religion (Berger 1990). 
Catholics and Protestants have lost some members to smaller religious groups in 
Austria, while most who have left became secular. Crockett and Voas (2006) find 
that secularisation, at least in Britain, is characterised by each generation being 
less religious than the previous one. In sociology the meaning of secularisation 
and how religion (belief, practice, membership, etc.) has evolved during the last 
decades is much discussed (e.g., Knoblauch 1999). Berger (1988, 1990) argues 
that adherence to the main churches is declining and that people are searching for 
alternative religions. Luckmann (1991) on the other hand assumes that religion 
does not lose ground but only changes its form. However, analyses by Voas and 
Crockett (2005) suggest that the level and trends in religious belonging is strongly 
related to religious belief and attendance, based on evidence from British data. 
Our study does not address the theme of religiosity, but understands secularisation 
and religious belonging only as the self-reported religious affiliation and not as a 
measurement of religious beliefs.  
Most religions have a negative outlook on those who leave their faith. The 
largest group of church leavers are those who leave all religious beliefs and 
substitute them with secular views (Schluchter 1991)8. Some individuals re-enter 
the church at a later age, but most of those who exit remain secular throughout 
their lives.  
Active participation in the churches is likely to have decreased as 
secularisation became a mass movement in the late 1960s. The decline of the 
                                                 
8  Secularisation has been part of Austrian philosophy since the age of enlightenment (Schluchter 
1991). The church is losing its exclusive right to settle the norms, because there are other value 
systems which can guide one’s beliefs and lifestyle. “The result of the secularisation is that 
faith is getting more and more subjective as a consequence of alternative lifestyles.” 
(Schluchter 1991) Many spheres such as economy, policy, and science are not under the control 
of the church any more (Schluchter 1991; Zulehner 1993). More and more people are leaving 
the church because they find their moral concepts somewhere else and individuals are largely 
free to choose which view fits best for them (Schluchter 1991). Today we can say we have two 
tendencies, „the religion’s view of the world views only part of the world, and faith is 
subjective.” (Schluchter 1991) But also the possible religious views have become more 
multifarious. People have access to different religions, even within the Christian church or the 
Islamic world (Schloz et al. 2003). 
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number of Roman Catholics is a typical European phenomenon. In Latin America 
and Africa, the number of members of Christian churches is expected to increase 
because of demographic factors, i.e., high fertility. However, Latin America 
experiences a substantial amount of conversions from Catholicism to 
Protestantism (Saenz 2005). 
Religious teachings can affect the transmission of religion from parents to 
children and the degree of secularisation. For example the Christian attitude 
concerning children is deduced from the Bible, especially from Jesus’ behaviour 
and teaching towards children: “Let the little children come to me and do not try 
to stop them, for the kingdom of God belongs to such as these” (Bible, Mark 10: 
14).  
In Islam, leaving one’s religion (apostasy) is strongly opposed, and can be 
sanctioned, even by death9. Several Muslim organisations promote a more tolerant 
view, where also the right to convert should be allowed without penalties (Ahmad 
Faiz bin Abdul Rahman 1998; Rahman 1986). 
 
 
4  Projections 
The projections of the population by religion status from 2001 to 2051 were 
created using the PDE Population Software10, a simplified multi-state population 
projection program for states interacting with one another. States are defined by 
the user and can be regions, educational categories, ethnic or language groups, or 
other user-defined dimensions. The software requires data on fertility, mortality, 
migration and transition probabilities between states, by age and sex. This 
software has been utilised in recent years in many settings (for a recent listing see 
Lutz et al. 2007). 
The inputs required for the projections are the following: 
- Base year parameters: population by age, sex and religion status, age- and 
religion-specific fertility rates, age-, sex- and religion-specific mortality rates, 
age-, sex- and religion-specific net migration numbers, and transition rates 
between religion groups. 
- Scenario assumptions as to the future of the parameters listed above. 
The base-year population was taken from the 2001 census11. As mentioned 
above, we aggregated the population into five main religious categories: Roman 
                                                 
9  31% of British Muslims agree to the statement “Muslim conversion is forbidden and punishable 
by death” (Mirza et al. 2007). 
10  The PDE Population Projection software has been developed by the World Population Project 
at IIASA and is available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pub/software.html 
11  The question about religious affiliation has been asked in the census at least since 1971. People 
can choose between Roman Catholic, Protestant (Lutheran or Calvinist), Old Catholic, Muslim, 
Jewish or without religion. A blank space is provided to detail if they belong to another 
religion. The 2001 census tabulations are arranged in 35 religious categories in its most detailed 
version, aggregated to 11 categories as shown in table 4. 
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Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, other religions and without religion. A definition 
of the categories is given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: 
Definition of the religious categories used in the projections 
Categories Census categories 
Roman Catholic Roman Catholic church 
Protestant Protestant church 
Muslim Islamic religious community 
Other religion Other Catholic (united) churches 
Orthodox churches  
Other Christian communities  
Jewish religious community  
Other non-Christian communities 
Not indicated  
Others (before 2001) 
Without religion Individuals who declare no religious affiliation 
Source: Census 2001. 
 
4.1 Base-year fertility 
The base-year fertility is estimated from the census data on children ever born to 
women residing in Austria in 1981, 1991 and 2001. We do not have recent 
information on the intergenerational transmission of religion. Lutz (1985) showed 
that in the early 1980s in Austria, mothers were predominantly responsible for 
passing on their religious beliefs to their children in mixed couples with Roman 
Catholic and Protestant members. Therefore, we assume that children have the 
same religion as their mothers, regardless of the type of union, mono-religious or 
mixed. 
The methodology for calculating age-specific fertility differentials by religion 
is detailed in Appendix 1. Table 5 as well as Figures 2a-2f present the main 
results. In the period 1981-2001, the TFR in Austria declined from 1.7 to 1.3. 
Fertility declined for all religious affiliations. In absolute terms, the largest 
decrease of the TFR was observed among Muslims (by about 0.8), and the lowest 
among “other religions” (by about 0.3). The total number of children born in 
Austria was most strongly influenced by the declining fertility among Roman 
Catholics who constitute the major part of the Austrian population. The increasing 
number of persons without religious affiliation who have a significantly lower 
fertility than other groups also influenced the total decrease. The analysis also 
reveals that the population without religion had a very low fertility throughout the 
period observed, with a TFR of 1.1 children in 1981 and 0.9 in 2001.  
Detailed analysis by age (see Figures 2a-2f) shows two main tendencies in all 
religion groups: postponement of the age of having children and the decline in 
total fertility rates. The postponement of having children was common to all 
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groups except the Muslim population who in 2001 still had higher age-specific 
fertility rates (ASFR) at age 20-24 than those aged 25-29. The changes in the 
ASFR among religions had two main patterns. The Roman Catholic and 
Protestant populations in the first period 1981-1991 postponed the main age 
period of childbearing from 20-24 to 25-29. Then in the second period 1991-2001 
the postponement of fertility continued (higher fertility at age 30+) but the 
stronger trend was the huge fertility decline at ages 20-30. 
 
Table 5: 
TFR and proportion by religion in the female population aged 15-49 in the period 
1981-2001 
 1981 1991 2001 
 TFR   Proportion   TFR  Proportion TFR   Proportion
Roman Catholic 1.70 85.7 1.52 78.8 1.32 74.5 
Protestant 1.51 5.8 1.37 5.1 1.21 4.5 
Muslim 3.09 0.9 2.77 1.9 2.34 4.6 
Other religion 1.70 3.4 1.61 7.1 1.44 6.2 
Without religion 1.12 4.2 1.04 7.1 0.86 10.2 
Total 1.67 100.0 1.51 100.0 1.33 100.0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations and Statistics Austria Datenbank ISIS 
 
The results show that despite the differences among religion groups the 
fertility patterns of all groups tend to follow similar trends, albeit at different 
periods of time and with different scales. The sources of the differences in fertility 
patterns beside the impact of religion on sexual behaviour are also other features 
correlated with religion that diversify the fertility behaviour of women, such as 
education level, immigration status or labour market participation. 
 
4.2 Base-year mortality 
Mortality differentials by religion were not considered in this project, as the data 
are not available, the religion of the deceased not being entered in the death 
register. Although it would be possible to link the census data to the death 
register, this was not feasible in the framework of this survey. Mortality rates are 
extracted from life tables available at Statistics Austria and are kept equal across 
all religious affiliations (Statistics Austria ISIS). 
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Figures 2a-2f: 
Age-specific fertility rates of the total population and of different religion groups in 
Austria in the period 1981-2001 
Figure 2a: Total population Figure 2b: Roman Catholic 
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Figure 2c: Protestant Figure 2d: Muslim 
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Figure 2e: Other religion 
 
Figure 2f: Without religion
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1981 1991 2001
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1981 1991 2001
Sources: Authors’ calculations and Statistics Austria Datenbank ISIS 
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4.3 Base-year migration 
Migration is a key factor in the changing religious landscape of Austria. The 
number of migrants has been increasing importantly in the last years, and 
especially since 2002. The net number of migrants has more than doubled 
between 1999 and 2004 due to an important increase of migrants coming mostly 
from former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and 
Montenegro,), eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia), 
Germany and Turkey. Unfortunately we lack data on the faith of immigrants 
and/or emigrants in Austria. Religious affiliation was inferred from the country of 
origin. In a first step, we retrieved the number of in-migrants and out-migrants for 
the 40 countries with the highest absolute net-migration for the period 1999-2004, 
for which data is available. In a second step, we used the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)-World Factbook (2005) that gives statistics on all the countries in 
the world to retrieve the shares of the population by religious affiliations. These 
shares were then applied to the flows for the period 1999-2004 to distribute the 
emigrants and immigrants according to the religious beliefs of their country of 
origin (see Figures 4 and 5). The assumption that migrants have the same 
distribution as the rest of the population in their country of origin is, of course, 
quite daring. In certain cases, ethnic or religious conflicts could affect outbound 
migration of specifically persecuted groups. However, in the absence of better 
information, this was felt to be the best approximation method. The stocks of 
migrants obtained for the two flows were then disaggregated by age and sex 
according to the overall share by age and sex of inflows and outflows. The 
resulting age structure of the net migration by religion is shown in Figure 3.  
While the net-number of migrants has considerably increased in the last five 
years, the composition of migrants by religious categories is rather stable across 
those last six years. Catholics are principally out-migrants originating for a large 
extent from Austria. They represented 38 to 44% of the in-migration and about 
48-54% of the out-migration during the 1999-2004 period. The share of the 
Protestant population is very stable in both stocks of immigrants and emigrants 
across the last six years, respectively around 8% and 7%, which makes migration 
an important source of new members for the Protestant church. Protestants mostly 
originate from Germany, and also from Slovakia and Romania. The proportion of 
Muslims moving into the country is fluctuating between 18 and 23% of all 
migrants, mostly originating from Iran, Nigeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey. 
The proportion of those leaving Austria who are Muslim is around 15 %. 
Members of other religions are entering Austria increasingly—in fact this is the 
fastest growing religious group—and made up 16-26% of the total flow of 
immigrants during the 1999-2004 period. The in-flows of the category Other 
religions are mostly composed of Orthodox Christians from eastern Europe and 
former Yugoslavia, i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia 
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and Montenegro. Migrants without religion form about 9% of in-flows and 10% 
of out-flows originating mostly from eastern and western Europe. 
 
Figure 3: 
Age structure of net migration by religious affiliation 
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Figure 4: 
Average religious composition of in-flows and out-flows of migration to and from 
Austria during the 1999-2004 period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Statistics Austria Yearbooks 2000 to 2006, CIA (2005) and authors’ calculations. 
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For all religions, the peak of net migration happens at age 25-30, resulting 
also in a population peak for net-migrants aged 0-4 as many migrants seem to be 
bringing their young children. After age 30, migration is steadily declining across 
religion groups. Noticeably, the net migration of Catholics is negative after age 
35-40, indicating a greater share of Catholics emigrating out of Austria at older 
ages. 
 
Figure 5: 
In-flows and out-flows of migrants (in thousands) by religion to and from Austria 
during the 1999-2004 period 
Sources: Statistics Austria Yearbooks 2000 to 2006, CIA (2005) and authors’ calculations. 
 
4.4 Base-year transitions 
The transitions measure the flows occurring between religions, meaning moving 
from one religious affiliation to another one. The transitions in Austria from 1991 
to 2003 are given in Table 6. Out of the twenty flows possible between the five 
religious categories, two seem predominant and will shape the future composition 
of the religious landscape of the country. 
Those flows reflect the progressing secularisation of the country, especially 
through the exodus of members of the Roman Catholic church. These were 
estimated to be around 34,000 on average per year for the period 2001-2006. This 
estimate may seem rather conservative in view of the higher number of Catholics 
leaving the Roman Catholic church in some particular years, i.e., 1995, 1999 and 
2004. Those years were considered to be outliers for those peaks were mostly 
caused by scandals based on allegations of sexual abuse of children by Catholic 
priests. About 2,200 are moving out of the Protestant church every year for the 
same period. Abandonment of religion is much harder in other religions such as 
Islam, the Jewish faith and Hinduism. Changes in the Muslim and ‘other’ 
religious categories will occur mainly through fertility and migration. 
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Table 6: 
Annual Conversion Flows of Roman Catholics, Protestants and all other religions (in 
thousands), 1994-2004 
Flow Religion 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Roman Catholics 35.4 43.5 37.1 32.2 38.4 43.6 35.7 33.9 33.9 39.6 52.2 
Protestants 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.4 Exit 
Other religions 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Roman Catholics 4.0 3.8 3.6 4.0 3.0 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 
Protestants 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Entrance 
Other religions 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Roman Catholics -31.3 -39.7 -33.5 -28.2 -35.4 -40.2 -32.0 -30.1 -30.1 -35.7 -48.3 
Protestants -2.0 -1.8 -2.1 -1.9 -2.1 -2.5 -2.5 -2.3 -2.5 -2.4 -2.6 
Net 
 
Other religions 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 
Source: Statistics Austria Yearbooks 1996 to 2006. 
 
The age patterns of transition, shown in Figure 6, were calculated based on 
comparison between censuses 1981-1991 and 1991-2001 using the estimates of 
net-migration by age for sub-national population applying the census survival rate 
method. 
Rates of secularisation peak for both Catholics and Protestants at age 25-29. 
At all ages, transitions are higher for men compared to women. Protestants seem 
to experience a second peak spread across ages 40 to 60, and this is particularly 
marked for women. A similar event happens for Catholics but at a lower scale. 
  
Figure 6: 
Age pattern of secularisation rates (in percentage) for Roman Catholics and 
Protestants, male and female, 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
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This phenomenon might be related to the higher incomes perceived by people in 
these age groups, pointing them to escape the church tax which is based on 
income. The age-specific secularisation rates were scaled up and down to 
reproduce the flows observed around the base-year. 
 
4.5 Scenarios 
The scenarios should help in answering the main questions we have about the 
future of religions in Austria: 
Question 1: If secularisation and the increase of other religions in the 
population continue, when will Roman Catholics make up less than 50% of the 
total population? 
Question 2: Will the Muslims or those without religion become the dominant 
group in Austria? 
Question 3: What is the influence of migration on the religious structure of the 
country? 
Question 4: Could a change in the religious composition lead to increased 
fertility in Austria? 
 
We developed a matrix of twelve12 scenarios emerging from the combination 
of several hypotheses on the different demographic determinants and the 
determinants of religious compositional change that is fertility, migration and 
transition/secularisation. 
 
Fertility13: “Stable fertility” scenario (Fs): Fertility by religion remains constant 
at the levels observed in 2001. Hence, the Muslim population keeps at a higher 
fertility level than the rest of the population with a TFR of 2.34 children per 
woman.14 This scenario also implies that the secularised population maintains its 
                                                 
12  We have in fact looked at many other scenarios, particularly regarding the influence of a higher 
share of Muslims migrating to Austria in the future. We have also considered an intermediate 
fertility path where the fertility of all religious groups would be not completely converging to 
the same level. Another set of scenarios looked at the possibility of Muslim secularisation. 
Results of those scenarios are not presented here in order to shorten the number of scenarios 
and to stick to actually visible trends. Details on other results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
13  Children are born in the same category as their mother. This is consistent with several studies 
that show the mother is more influential in the choice of the religion of children, especially in 
the case of mixed marriages (Lutz 1985). However, we do not consider what could happen 
within a more balanced religious composition of the country where the rate of mixed marriages 
may increase and affect the choice of one or no religion for the children. 
14  This scenario does not take into account tempo-effects, where postponement leads to a 
temporary increase in period fertility at later stages (see e.g., Sobotka 2004). The stable 
relatively high fertility among Muslims can be partly explained by the fact that parental leave in 
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very low fertility, which may be unlikely in a situation of diffusion where more 
and more people move to this group, coming from different fertility backgrounds. 
“Converging fertility” scenario (Fc): Fertility by religion converges to a TFR 
of 1.4 children by 2026-2031, and remains constant afterwards. This TFR is in 
accordance with the medium variant of the Austrian population projection. The 
convergence scenario implies three main assumptions. First, fertility in Austria 
will stay at very low levels at least until the middle of the century. Second, the 
different generations of migrants will rapidly adopt the low fertility pattern 
existing in Austria. And third, the population without any religion will increase its 
fertility. 
 
Mortality: One single trend, following the medium variant of population 
projections for mortality of the Austrian Statistical Office (Statistics Austria 
2003). All religions follow the same mortality pattern with an increase in life 
expectancy between 2001-2006 and 2046-2051 from 76 to 83 years for males and 
from 82 to 88 for females.  
 
Migration: “Medium migration” scenario (Mm): The net number of migrants 
follows the medium variant for population projections of the Austrian Statistical 
Office. Under this scenario, net migration will increase strongly until 2011 when 
it will peak at 28,000 migrants each year, declining slowly thereafter until it 
reaches its lowest level in 2026 with 19,000 net migrants per year. A mild 
increase is envisaged for the second half of the projection period up to 22,000 by 
2051. The age and sex patterns of migrants follow those observed in 2001. The 
religious affiliation of migrants is kept at levels similar to those observed in 2001: 
18% are Catholics, 8% are Protestants, 38% are Muslims, 28% have another 
religion and 9% are without religion. 
“High migration” scenario (Mh): Same as in Mm, except that the net number 
of migrants follows the high variant for migration stated in the population 
projections of the Austrian Statistical Office. The net number of migrants per year 
fluctuates between 27,000 and 38,000 during the 2001-2051 period in a sequence 
similar to that observed for the medium migration scenario. 
 
Transition/Secularisation: “Constant secularisation” scenario (Tc): This 
scenario implies constant transition rates at the levels observed in 2001 for 
transitions of Catholics and Protestants to ‘without religion’ (as shown in Figure 
6). In the 2001-2006 period, this means 34,000 leaving the Roman Catholic 
church and about 2,200 the Protestant church every year. This scenario mainly 
shows the depletion of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches due to present 
trends in secularisation. This “business as usual” scenario allows us to observe the 
effect of present depletion on the future religious composition.  
                                                                                                                          
Austria since 2002 has been made available for all women, regardless of whether they had an 
employment contract before they get a child (Bundesministerium für soziale Sicherheit 2005). 
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“High secularisation” scenario (Th): The transition rates double between 
2001-2006 and 2026-2031 and remain constant afterwards. As in scenario Tc, the 
overall age pattern is kept constant. This shows a strengthening of the current 
trend where people are increasingly leaving the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
churches (see Table 6).  
Scenario “Low secularisation” (Tl): The transition rates converge to zero by 
2026-2031 so that by 2031, everybody stays in the religious groups he/she was 
born into. This scenario describes a reversal of the present trend over a rather long 
period of 25 years, for secularisation might just be a temporary phenomenon as 
argued for instance by Kaufmann (2006).  
The matrix of the 12 scenarios emerging from the combination of the 
hypothesis on the different demographic determinants is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: 
Matrix of scenarios 
Migration 
Fertility Transition/ Secularisation Medium  (Mm) 
High  
(Mh) 
Constant (Tc) Fs Mm Tc Fs Mh Tc 
High (Th) Fs Mm Th Fs Mh Th Stable (Fs) 
Low (Tl) Fs Mm Tl Fs Mh Tl 
Constant (Tc) Fc Mm Tc Fc Mh Tc 
High (Th) Fc Mm Th Fc Mh Th Converging (Fc) 
Low (Tl) Fc Mm Tl Fc Mh Tl 
 
4.6 Scenario results 
We will look at four main indicators to reflect upon the changes induced through 
our twelve scenarios by changes in the religious composition of the population: 
total population size, total fertility rate, share of the population by religious 
categories, and the religion structure of the population by large age-groups.  
4.6.1 Population 
The Austrian population will start shrinking in all twelve scenarios, as shown in 
Figure 7. The time at which this will happen varies within the period from 2031 to 
2051. We can identify two main groups of scenarios when looking across total 
population size results. The top group of scenarios leading to higher population 
growth is those combining high migration with the different fertility and transition 
scenarios. The total population would start decreasing after reaching its maximum 
in 2040 and count between 8.5 and 8.6 millions in 2051. Religion will contribute 
to population growth if migrants keep having a differentiated pattern of fertility, 
especially regarding the fertility of the Muslim population. It is clear that unless 
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there is high migration, the population will start diminishing before 2030 and 
Austria would have between 8.0 and 8.1 inhabitants in 2051. 
 
 
Figure 7: 
Total population of Austria, 2001-2051, 12 scenarios 
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4.6.2 Fertility 
In terms of total fertility rate, the range would vary between 1.4 and 1.5 children 
in 2046-51, as shown in Figure 8. In case of constant fertility differentials within 
religious categories, the total fertility rate would still increase to 1.5 children 
because of the changing weights of the different religious categories with 
increasing weight of the more fertile groups (Muslims). The convergence of 
fertility scenario obviously leads to a smaller increase in fertility, to the target 
level of 1.4 children in 2026-32. 
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Figure 8: 
TFR of Austria, 2001-2051, 12 scenarios  
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4.6.3 Religious Composition 
The different scenarios will affect the religious composition of the population. All 
scenarios show a severe decline of the Roman Catholic proportion in the total 
population, see Figure 9. Only if this downward trend can be stopped by 2031, 
due to a less pronounced secularisation trend (Tl), the Roman Catholics still stand 
a chance to keep their share in the total population above 55% in 2051 as shown 
by the upper lines in Figure 9. In all the other scenarios, the Roman Catholic  
 
Figure 9: 
Proportion Roman Catholics in total population, 2001-2051, 12 scenarios 
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church would make up less than 50% of all religious affiliations by 2051. If the 
transition is kept constant at present levels, the proportion of Roman Catholics 
would drop to 45-47%, and it could fall below 40% if secularisation rates were to 
double between 2001 and 2051 (the lowest value is 37% according to scenario 
Stable fertility/High migration/High secularisation). As our migration scenarios 
entail a small proportion of Catholics in the net number of migrants, migration is 
not influencing the share of Catholics very much. Then again it is important to 
note that Catholicism would still be the dominant religion—at least until 2051—
as no single other religion would have a share above 35%. 
The projections show in most cases a diminishing share for the Protestant 
population. It could fluctuate between 3.4% and 5.2% of the total population by 
2051 (see Figure 10). However, and contrary to what we have seen for the Roman 
Catholic church, the Protestant church may witness a rise of its membership—
from the levels observed in 2001—if secularisation rates were to decline to nil 
mostly due to the benefit of a higher share of Protestants in the immigrant 
population (above 8%) than in the emigrant one (7%) due to in-migration from 
Germany and eastern European countries. 
 
Figure 10: 
Proportion Protestants in total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
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The fastest increase will definitely be that of the Muslim population, which 
was the smallest religious group in Austria in 2001 (see Figure 11). From 4% of 
the population in 2001, its share could be as high as 18% in 2051—this, however, 
in case of stable fertility differentials with higher fertility of Muslim women 
compared to all other groups, which is rather unrealistic. The share of the Muslim 
population would increase to 14-15% in the case of a convergence of fertility 
rates to way-below replacement fertility. 
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Figure 11: 
Proportion Muslims in total population, 2001-2051, 12 scenarios  
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Source: Authors’ calculations  
 
Migration will increase the diversity of religion in Austria as can be seen from 
the share of ‘other religions’ shown in Figure 12. This would be mostly due to the 
in-migration of Orthodox Christians from former Yugoslavia. While in 2001, only 
about 5% of the population belonged to the “other religion” category, they could 
be as many as 11% in 2051. 
 
Figure 12: 
Proportion Other religions in total population, 2001-2051, 12 scenarios 
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The future of the group ‘without religion’ will be logically highly dependent 
on the transition from the Roman Catholic and—to a lesser extent—from the 
Protestant churches. The secularised population will be the second largest group 
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by the middle of the century in most scenarios. The scenario lines in Figure 13 
can be divided into three main groups. If the secularisation rate increases further 
(Th) the share of the population without any religion could be as high as 30-34%. 
The constant secularisation scenario gives an intermediate picture, in which the 
group ‘without religion’ will still grow considerably to 22-24% of the population. 
Only if the rate of secularisation were to come to a complete stop by 2031 (Tl) 
would this category stagnate around 11-13% during the 50-year projection period.  
The religious landscape of the country will change considerably in the next 50 
years and this will also have some repercussions at the age group level as can be 
seen from Figure 14 (complete results available in Appendix 2) showing the 
division between different age groups representing the young, the working and 
the old generations. In 2001, there were very little differences in the distribution 
by religious affiliation across generations since the share of Catholics at all ages 
was above 72%. In 2051, if we consider the scenario with Converging 
fertility/Medium migration/Constant transition, while 53% of the 65+ generation 
will be Roman Catholics, only 43% of the working age population will have this 
affiliation. The 0-14 age group will consist of 17% Muslims whereas only 8% 
will have this affiliation in the old generation.  
The differences could even be more extreme if both migration and 
secularisation were to increase. Scenario Stable fertility/High migration/High 
transition shows that only 32% of the working generation are Roman Catholics 
compared to 46% of the old generation. Likewise, the proportion of Muslims is 
more than three times higher in the young age group than in the old one (32% vs. 
9%) in this scenario. 
 
Figure 13: 
Proportions Without religion in total population, 2001-2051, 12 scenarios 
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Figure 14:  
Population by age and religion in Austria, 2001 and scenarios FsMhTh, FcMmT, and 
FcMmTc for 2051 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5  Conclusion 
The dominance of the Roman Catholic church in Austria has been challenged 
during the last thirty years. The projections presented in this paper show some 
interesting results as to the future religious composition of the country.  
In our calculations we find that the share of Roman Catholics is likely to fall 
below 50% by 2051. Some scenarios even show a decline below the 40% line. 
However, in all cases they will still be the largest religious community in Austria 
for the first half of the twenty-first century. The share of Protestants will remain 
relatively stable over the projection period, around 3-5%.  
Our projections show that Austria will not have a secularised or a Muslim 
majority by 2051. The share of the population without religion in 2051 is 
nevertheless highly uncertain: it could be as low as 11% and as high as 34%. The 
Muslim population has already experienced a sharp increase, from 1% in 1981 to 
4% in 2001, and by 2051 will represent 14 to 18% of the population. Other 
religious categories will increase their weight in Austria as well, to be around 
11% by 2051. The rapid changes will also provoke imbalances with regard to the 
religious composition of the different age categories. 
The implications of those compositional changes will certainly play an 
important role for the societal future of Austria. As the trends observed in Austria 
are not only specific to this country and may reflect an overall tendency of many 
European and North American societies, we would like to further apply the 
methodology of multi-state population projection by level of religion to other 
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countries where similar data are available, such as Canada and Switzerland, in 
order to gain some comparative knowledge on the future religious composition of 
those countries and the impact it may have on many demographic indicators. 
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Appendix 1: Methodology for Estimating the Fertility by 
Religion of Mothers 
The base-year fertility in different age groups was estimated from the census data 
on children ever born to women with different religious affiliation residing in 
Austria in 1981, 1991 and 2001 using data from Austrian censuses. The second 
data source was the TFR (Total Fertility Rates) and ASFR (Age-Specific Fertility 
Rates) for the whole population calculated by Statistics Austria for the years 
1981, 1991 and 2001. 
The calculation of ASFRs for different religion groups was based on the 
assumption that their fertility was proportional to the average increment of cohort 
parities between two censuses. The number of children ever born (by women with 
religious affiliation) was used to calculate the average parities and increment of 
cohort parities between two surveys (for method of calculation of the average 
parities, see: United Nations 1983 p. 58). Then these increments for different age 
groups were treated as the fertility of the hypothetical cohort. These results were 
the basis to calculate proportions between the fertility of mothers with each age 
group and the fertility of all mothers, called herein the relative fertility indicators. 
The ASFRs for different religion groups in 1991 and 2001 was reconstructed 
using these indicators for the periods 1981-1991 and 1991-2001 and the ASFR for 
the total population in 1981, 1991 and 2001. 
The results of the method described above should be considered as rough 
estimations of the fertility rates for different religion groups, for a number of 
assumptions are made during this procedure: 1) The procedure assures that 
specific fertility rates for different religion groups are consistent with the age-
specific fertility rate for the whole population published by Statistics Austria, but 
the relations between fertility figures can differ from the relations between the 
increment of cohort parities between two censuses. 2) It is assumed that parity 
increments are unaffected by migration and mortality. If the immigration is 
composed mainly of women with higher fertility, it can lead to overestimation of 
children born in Austria because some of the children of these women were born 
outside Austria. If women with higher fertility have a higher probability of death 
it could lead to underestimation of fertility because relatively more mothers with 
higher fertility die between censuses 3) It is assumed that the birth of a child does 
not affect religious conversion. If a change of religion is correlated with the birth 
of a child (for example. because of marriage), this could increase the fertility of 
the religion frequently chosen by mothers. 
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Appendix 2: Tabular Results of Age and Religion 
Table A1: 
Proportion by age and religion in 2001 and 2051 according to 12 scenarios 
Religion  
Year 
 
Fertility 
 
Migration 
 
Transition 
Age-
groups Catholic Protestant Muslim Other Without 
0-14 78.2 4.2 7.4 5.4 4.7 
15-64 71.7 4.6 4.3 6.0 13.4 2001 
65+ 77.1 5.7 0.4 3.0 13.8 
2051 Stable Medium Constant 0-14 44.1 4.3 30.5 11.8 9.3 
 Stable Medium Constant 15-64 42.7 4.3 18.8 11.8 22.6 
 Stable Medium Constant 65+ 52.8 3.5 8.4 7.9 27.3 
 Stable Medium High 0-14 38.9 4.0 31.3 12.2 13.6 
 Stable Medium High 15-64 32.4 3.5 18.9 11.8 33.4 
 Stable Medium High 65+ 46.7 2.9 8.4 7.9 34.0 
 Stable Medium Low 0-14 49.7 4.5 29.6 11.5 4.6 
 Stable Medium Low 15-64 55.6 5.2 18.7 11.7 8.9 
 Stable Medium Low 65+ 59.7 4.2 8.4 7.9 19.8 
 Stable High Constant 0-14 43.2 4.4 31.0 12.3 9.1 
 Stable High Constant 15-64 41.9 4.4 19.3 12.3 22.1 
 Stable High Constant 65+ 52.3 3.6 8.8 8.2 27.0 
 Stable High High 0-14 38.2 4.2 31.8 12.6 13.2 
 Stable High High 15-64 32.0 3.6 19.4 12.4 32.6 
 Stable High High 65+ 46.3 3.0 8.8 8.2 33.6 
 Stable High Low 0-14 48.6 4.7 30.1 11.9 4.7 
 Stable High Low 15-64 54.3 5.4 19.2 12.2 8.9 
 Stable High Low 65+ 59.1 4.3 8.8 8.2 19.6 
 Converging Medium Constant 0-14 49.3 5.2 16.8 11.8 16.9 
 Converging Medium Constant 15-64 43.4 4.4 16.3 11.6 24.2 
 Converging Medium Constant 65+ 52.8 3.5 8.4 7.9 27.3 
 Converging Medium High 0-14 42.5 4.8 16.9 11.8 24.0 
 Converging Medium High 15-64 32.9 3.6 16.3 11.6 35.5 
 Converging Medium High 65+ 46.7 2.9 8.4 7.9 34.0 
 Converging Medium Low 0-14 56.9 5.6 16.8 11.7 8.9 
 Converging Medium Low 15-64 56.7 5.4 16.3 11.6 10.0 
 Converging Medium Low 65+ 59.7 4.2 8.4 7.9 19.8 
 Converging High Constant 0-14 48.4 5.4 17.3 12.3 16.6 
 Converging High Constant 15-64 42.7 4.6 16.9 12.2 23.7 
 Converging High Constant 65+ 52.3 3.6 8.8 8.2 27.0 
 Converging High High 0-14 41.9 4.9 17.4 12.3 23.4 
 Converging High High 15-64 32.5 3.8 16.9 12.2 34.6 
 Converging High High 65+ 46.3 3.0 8.8 8.2 33.6 
 Converging High Low 0-14 55.8 5.8 17.2 12.2 8.9 
 Converging High Low 15-64 55.4 5.6 16.8 12.2 10.0 
 Converging High Low 65+ 59.1 4.3 8.8 8.2 19.6 
 
